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ABSTRACT
The Copyright Act has not kept pace with the times, and the next revolution is going full stream ahead.
Rather than adapt, entrenched interests at the Copyright table push for more protection, while new
technologies are demonized and underrepresented. The resulting Copyright Act’s provisions relating
to internet-based radio, ranging from passive over-the-air broadcasts to fully interactive music hosting
sites, are a patchwork of accommodations and concessions to these interests. For all non-interactive
services, licensing music typically occurs within the Copyright Act’s compulsory licensing system. For
interactive webcasters, licensing negotiations take place with the copyright holders directly. These
negotiations have proven disastrous for all but the biggest of interactive broadcasters, and neither
Pandora nor Spotify has posted a profitable quarter to date. The February 2014 In re Pandora Media
decision in the Southern District of New York illustrates the lack of a free market for recorded music.
The unique market for recorded music, the antiquated regulatory framework and the sheer volume of
copyrighted works suggests that no satisfactory alternative to licensing through copyright exist. The
article proposes that with legislative changes meant to withstand time and technological revolutions,
the Copyright Act can once again harmonize with its original, explicit goals.
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DID COPYRIGHT KILL THE RADIO STAR? WHY THE RECORDED MUSIC
INDUSTRY AND COPYRIGHT ACT SHOULD WELCOME WEBCASTERS INTO
THE FOLD
PATRICK KONCEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Technology and copyright law continue to do battle; the battlefield itself continues
to change. The acceleration of advances in music delivery business models and in the
accompanying technology has far outpaced the copyright structure’s ability to adapt. 1
The music industry struggles to mount effective defenses to this perceived
technological threat.2 Since the inception of recordable media, copyright law and
practice has accommodated each new advance in technology with incremental
legislative and judicial action, resulting in a fractured regulatory structure and
inconsistent common law.3 The resulting Copyright Act is the dense product of lobbyist
effort on behalf of powerful interest groups. 4 The product of all this effort is a
Copyright Act unable to effectively regulate and enforce rights in the modern music
industry.5
Fast-forward to 2014, and technology is yet again changing how the public
consumes music.6 The public demands to hear more music, they want it when they
* © Patrick Koncel 2015. Patrick Koncel is a January 2016 J.D. Candidate at the John Marshall
Law School in Chicago, Illinois. I received a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Psychology in 2003 from
Northern Illinois University. I have attended over 500 live concerts and I have great passion for music
in all forms. I am indebted to my editor Angela Huisingh for her attention, effort, and guidance. I
would like to thank my fiancée Anna Wolthuis for her unwavering support during the comment
writing process which occupied me for months.
1 See Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 156 (2nd Cir. 2009)(quoting a
letter from the Copyright Office acknowledging “rapidly changing business models emerging in today’s
digital marketplace….”).
2 See Mary Madden, The State of Music Online: Ten Years After Napster, PEW INTERNET & AM.
LIFE PROJECT (June 15, 2009), http://www.pewinternet.org/2009/06/15/the-state-of-music-online-tenyears-after-napster/#fn-534-33 (detailing the recorded music industry’s mostly unsuccessful efforts to
enforce their copyrights in the wake of Napster).
3 E.g., Audio Home Recording Act (“AHRA”)(1995)(codified as amended in 17 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1010)(creating a statutorily imposed tax in exchange for the ability to sell machines that allow
recording of music enacted in response to cheap, widely available recordable Betamax videocassette
tapes); Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act, Pub L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336
(1995)(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.)(creating a limited performance right in digital audio
transmissions for sound recording copyright holders enacted in response to the advent of online
storage and broadcast of music); Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), Pub. L. No. 105-304,
112 Stat. 2860 (1998)(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.)(creating statutory
requirements prohibiting “circumvention” measures in response to online piracy enacted in the wake
of peer-to-peer sharing).
4 Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 5 (2010).
5 Id. at 3 (observing that the solutions that came about in each of these changes are now obsolete
or irrelevant).
6 Seth Ericsson, The Recorded Music Industry and the Emergence of Online Music Distribution:
Innovation in the Absence of Copyright (Reform), 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1783, 1784 (2011)(“The
widespread and ever-growing practice of online music distribution has forever changed the way
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ask for it, and they want to hear it for free.7 Internet radio “webcasters” fill this
demand.8 The varied new media9 business models in play today range from simple
digital radio broadcasts to on-demand streaming in which the user exercises full
control over the music that plays. 10 Pandora, Spotify, and other webcasters transmit
music over high-speed wireless networks to millions of computers, cell phones, car
radios, and other devices around the globe every day. 11 As a result of this high level of
availability, the question the public is asking is no longer, “Why would I buy this music
when I can download it for free?” but rather “Why would I illegally download this song
when I can listen to it for free on-demand?”12
Webcasting provides a valuable service to the music industry: by “offering what
the pirates offer,” webcasters cannibalize illegal peer-to-peer downloads.13
Additionally, webcasters benefit the public by contributing to a “vibrant cultural
community” in the digital music marketplace by providing exposure and access to
artists and genres through on-demand selections that traditional radio stations do not
play.14 Using on-demand and customizable radio stations, webcasters provide benefits
collect, consume, and experience music.”); See also, Robert J. Delchin, Musical Copyright Law: Past,
Present and Future of Online Music Distribution, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 343, 344 (2004).
7 SPOTIFY, www.spotify.com/us, (last visited Apr. 19, 2014)(highlighting Spotify’s selling points to
the listening public, including free on-demand at home streaming and advertising premium
subscription service).
8
Digital
Definitions,
HARRY
FOX
AGENCY,
https://www.harryfox.com/public/DigitalDefinitions.jsp#71 (last visited Apr. 27, 2014)(“Webcasting
generally refers to online streaming, either live or on-demand, of an audio or video source to various
simultaneous users”).
9 In Re Pandora Media, LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36914, *1, *2 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)(“’New
media’ refers generally to internet transmissions.”).
10 17 U.S.C § 114(j)(7)(2011)(An “interactive service” is one that enables a member of the public
to receive a transmission of a program specially created for the recipient, or on request, a transmission
of a particular sound recording, whether or not it is part of a program, which is selected by or on behalf
of the recipient.); See also, Arista Records, 578 F.3d at 150 (stating that webcasters that provide free
services that do not provide particular sound recordings on-demand are non-interactive); In re
Pandora, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36914 at *26 (characterizing Pandora as a “customizable radio
service,” however, non-interactive according to the statute).
11 See Listener Stats: Pandora Blinks, INVESTOR NEWS (Mar. 6, 2014, 7:04 PM),
http://news.investors.com/030614-692425-stats-pandora-blinks.htm (noting that Pandora’s listener
hours during the month of February rose from 1.38 billion in 2013 to 1.51 billion in February 2014);
SPOTIFY, http://press.spotify.com/us/information/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2014)(indicating that Spotify
has
over
24
million
active
users);
PANDORA,
http://investor.pandora.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=227956&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1915496&highlight=
(last visited Apr. 12, 2014)(indicating that Pandora listenership as of the end of March 2014 was 75.3
million).
12
Music File Sharing Declines Significantly in 2012, THE NPD GROUP, INC.,
https://www.npd.com/wps/portal/npd/us/news/press-releases/the-npd-group-music-file-sharingdeclined-significantly-in-2012/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2014)(noting that peer-to-peer music sharing
declined 17% in 2012 compared to 2011, illegal downloads declined 26% in the same period, and
asserting that “the primary reason for this reduction in sharing activity is an increased use of free,
legal music streaming services.”).
13 Statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet,
and
Intellectual
Prop.
(2005),
UNITED
STATES
COPYRIGHT
OFFICE
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat062105.html#N_1_ (asserting that “in order to compete with the
pirates, we must offer what they offer”).
14 Shane Wagman, I Want My MP3: Legal And Policy Barriers To A Legitimate Digital
Marketplace, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 95, 98 (2009)(stating “The Copyright Act’s purpose is to encourage
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to artists that may not have been realized otherwise. 15 Finally, most importantly to
the industry, and in contrast to both traditional terrestrial broadcast radio and
peer-to-peer file-sharing services, webcasters pay licensing and royalties fees to all
copyright holders.16
The recording industry has been slow to recognize the benefits internet radio
webcasters provide, partly because the industry as a whole has been reluctant to accept
that a revolution in listenership has taken place. 17 According to sales data from the
last fifteen years, the public has no intention of returning to the physical-medium
model of music delivery.18 It is natural that the parties who primarily benefitted from
now-obsolete musical media and delivery systems would resist such change.19 Against
this backdrop, the current licensing and regulatory framework threatens webcasters’
very existence.20 Webcasters and emerging technologies intending to enter the
a vibrant, accessible public culture,” as well as incentivize artists to create, and reward them for their
work).
15 Steve Bertoni, Why Musicians Must Embrace Spotify and Pandora, FORBES.COM (Jan. 17, 2014
7:09
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevenbertoni/2014/01/17/why-musicians-must-embracespotify-and-pandora/ (noting that “while most artists can’t depend on music streaming for cash
flow…they must rely on Spotify and others for something even more vital – exposure. Also explaining
that traditional radio is ‘monotonous and conservative’ and plays ‘less variety than ever’”).
16 See generally, SPOTIFY ARTISTS, How is Spotify Contributing to the Music Business?
https://www.spotifyartists.com/spotify-explained/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2014); Glenn Peoples, Business
Matters: The Truth About Pandora’s Payments to Artists, BILLBOARD BIZ (Oct. 10, 2012 3:05 PM),
http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/1083455/business-matters-the-truth-about-pandoraspayments-to-artists.
17 See Ericsson, supra note 6, at 1786 (arguing that although technological advances in online
music distribution has clearly affected the recorded music industry, the industry was still operating
according to a relatively traditional business model, which centers on the mass production and
distribution of physical goods).
18
2013
Mid-Year
Music
Industry
Report,
NIELSON
SOUNDSCAN,
http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/us/en/reports-downloads/2013%20Reports/NielsenMusic-2013-Mid-Year-US-Release.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2014) (reporting a 14.2% decline in album
sales in the first six months of 2014 compared to the same period in 2013, and a 24% increase in the
number of music streams over the same period); see also Jake Brown, Music Sales Over the Years:
2013 Year-End Soundscan Data, GLORIOUS NOISE (Jan. 6, 2014), http://gloriousnoise.com/2014/musicsales-over-the-years-2013-year-end-soundscan-data (compiling data from Nielson to produce report
showing that CD sales peaked in 2000 with 730 million units sold, and that sales rapidly decline in
the subsequent years. In 2013, only 165.4 million units were sold); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., New Business
Models for Music, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J., 63, 65 (2011)[hereinafter “New Business Models”](“It
is clear that the old order has been swept away....Compact Discs are dead as a distribution medium.”).
19 See Ericsson, supra note 6, at 1797 (indicating that the image of the recorded music industry
after the Napster lawsuits was that of “a corporate machine seeking desperately to cling to an outdated
and inefficient business model by any means possible, including by terrorizing its own customers”).
20 See, e.g., Alex Pham, Last.fm Pulls Out of Radio Streaming, Plugs Into YouTube, BILLBOARD
BIZ
(Mar.
26,
2014
7:00
PM),
http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/digital-andmobile/6022007/lastfm-pulls-out-of-radio-streaming-plugs-in-youtube (noting that Last.fm is shutting
down its streaming service in Apr. 2014, also reporting that Last.fm struck deals with YouTube and
Spotify to plug into their services and continue to stream music without paying licensing fees); See
also, Ben Sisario, Pandora and Spotify Rake in the Money and Then Send it Off in Royalties, Media
Decoder,
NEW
YORK
TIMES
(Aug.
24,
2012,
6:07
PM),
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/24/pandora-and-spotify-rake-in-the-money-and-thensend-it-off-in-royalties/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=1
(reporting
that
Pandora lost $20 million on $81 million in revenue in the most recently reported quarter, and Spotify
reported a loss of $57 million and revenues of $236 million in 2011).
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marketplace face a complicated and expensive licensing scheme, potential litigation,
and legislative agenda that do not include webcasters’ interests. 21
Musicians and copyright holders deserve payment for their creative works, and
the public deserves access to those works. 22 Eliminating legislative obstacles to
innovations in musical dissemination and instituting a more equitable licensing
structure will better serve these twin objectives of copyright law. Although flawed, the
copyright licensing structure remains the most effective way to regulate and enforce
those intellectual property rights. This comment proposes that with reforms meant to
withstand change, and an effort to normalize and streamline licensing, copyright can
serve these purposes in the modern day, as well as be ready for the next revolution.
Part I will provide background into the complicated and divided world of copyright
enforcement in the technological age, focusing on online music delivery and digital
performance. Part I also provides an overview of the statutory framework of music
licensing and copyright royalties in the digital age. Part II explores the Copyright Act’s
fractured and inconsistent application in the digital age. Special interest groups
successfully lobbied for change in the Act, influencing major revisions of the Act. Part
II uses the recent In Re Pandora rate decision to illustrate the failure of the “willing
buyer/willing seller” model for setting copyright royalty rates. Finally, Part II explores
alternatives to statutory copyright licensing, and discusses the viability of each theory.
Part III suggests that copyright is the best way to regulate and enforce new media
models, and proposes a streamlined regulatory framework that allows for efficient
licensing of music both over traditional and digital broadcasts. By instituting
compulsory licensing for interactive webcasters as well as eliminating the exemption
for terrestrial broadcasts, the recording industry and webcasters can thrive in the
current landscape. No alternative to copyright in existence today protects copyrights
with a comprehensive system of regulations suitable to replace or substitute for
Copyright. Rather than bending to entrenched interests, the Copyright Act must be
rethought to be flexible and accommodating to new technologies. Part IV concludes
that the framework of the Copyright Act should embrace current technologies, allow
room for technological growth by being flexible enough to handle new technologies as
they emerge.

21 Cydney A. Tune and Christopher R. Lockard, Navigating the Tangled Web of Webcasting
Royalties, 27 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 20, 20 (2009)(asserting that “[w]eb sites who wish to perform music
within the confines of copyright law… have encountered a confusing, impractical, and intimidating
maze of laws and regulations governing music copyrights.”).
22 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)

The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering the Congress to grant
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors in ‘Science and Useful Arts.’ Sacrificial days devoted to
such creative efforts deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.

Id. at 219.
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II. BACKGROUND
Copyright’s royalty scheme is ill-equipped to handle these new advances in music
delivery, and neither the recorded music industry nor the copyright regime has
adapted to the changes in the consumptive paradigm. 23 Since at least 1999, the
recorded music industry has been fighting an uphill battle against various
permutations of online music delivery.24
A. Copyrights in Musical Works and Sound Recordings
The Constitution empowers Congress to “promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 25 Pursuant to this constitutional
mandate, Congress enacted the Copyright Act. 26 Congress intended to “secure the
benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors” by offering limited
monopolies in the form of copyrights.27 Copyright protection arises as an operation of
law when the “expression is fixed in a tangible medium.” 28 The Copyright Act grants
copyright holders protection in the form of a bundle of rights; including the right of
reproduction,29 of distribution,30 of public performance,31 and specifically in the case of
sound recordings, the right of public performance by means of digital audio
transmission.32 Thus, the Copyright creates causes of action against “anyone
who...trespasses into [the copyright holder’s] exclusive domain by using or authorizing
the use of the copyrighted work without permissions, is an infringer of copyright.” 33
23 See also Wagman, supra note 14, at 97 (arguing that “the tensions between copyright law and
current consumptive trends are hampering the effort to build new business models that compensate
artists, meet consumer need, and create an economically sustainable cultural community”); Ericsson,
supra note 6, at 97 (acknowledging the existence of “a technology-induced rift” between the copyright
regime and copyright’s constitutionally prescribed purpose of “promoting the Science and Useful
Arts”).
24 See Madden, supra note 2 (Stating that the RIAA filed more than 35,000 lawsuits against
individual infringers in the wake of Napster, but ultimately abandoned that strategy as largely
ineffective to stop music piracy); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001)(holding that Napster is liable for vicarious and contributory infringement for the illegal file
sharing of Napster users); See also, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
913, 941 (2005).
25 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
26 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2011).
27 See also Sony Corp of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)(“The
monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize….[are] the means by which an important public
purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by
the creation of a special reward.”); In Sony, the court noted that “the sole interest of the United States
and the primary object in conferring the monopoly...lie[s] in the general benefit[] derived by the public
from the labors of authors.” Id. at 432.
28 17 U.S.C § 102(a)(2011).
29 Id. § 106(1).
30 Id. § 106(3).
31 Id. § 106(4).
32 Id. § 106(6). The right to prepare derivative works and the right to publicly display works are
not implicated by this discussion. Id. § 106(2); § 106(5).
33 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 433; see also 17 U.S.C. § 501.
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Copyright protection adheres to a musical composition when it is fixed in any
medium, such as musical notes on a page of sheet music or lyrics on a napkin.34 In
1971, with the invention of the recordable cassette tape, Congress declared that the
sound recordings themselves constituted copyrightable material. 35 As a result of this
legislation, today there are two protected works embodied in every recorded song, one
in the underlying “musical work” and another in the sound recording itself. 36 Congress
further protected sound recordings by defining internet broadcasts as “performances”
under the Copyright Act, and enacting the digital performance right for sound
recordings in 1995.37
Music delivery platforms implicate the exclusive rights of copyright holders in
various ways, meaning the requirements of each entity can be vastly different. 38
Broadcasting a work on the radio implicates the exclusive right to public performance
of both the musical work and the sound recording copyright holder. 39 Terrestrial radio
broadcasts currently enjoy an exemption from paying royalties to the sound recording
copyright holder.40 However, playing to an internet-based audience implicates the
exclusive right to reproduction and to public performance by digital audio transmission
in both the musical work and the sound recording. 41 A digital audio transmission
invokes two rights of two copyright holders are invoked in a digital audio transmission,
and transmitters must obtain licenses for all four uses.42

34 Id. (“Copyright protection subsists...in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”); 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2011)(A work is “created” when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecords for the first time).
35 Copyright protection in sound recordings were first recognized in the Sound Recording
Amendment of 1971 (“SRA”), 85 Stat. 391 (1971).
36 Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 487 (3rd Cir. 2003)(noting that the owner of a
copyright of a sound recording has little copyright protection, and before 1971 had no protection at
all).
37 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act, Pub L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336
(1995)(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); see also Ericsson supra note 6.
38 See Summary of the Determination of the Librarian of Congress on Rates and Terms for
Webcasting
and
Ephemeral
Recordings,
UNITED
STATES
COPYRIGHT
OFFICE,
http://www.copyright.gov/carp/webcasting_rates_final.html (last visited Jun. 28, 2014)(showing the
rate determinations in a chart separated by the classification of the music delivery service).
39 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2011)(defining “performance” as reciting or playing any musical work, either
directly or by means of any device, and defining “public performance” as any transmission of a
performance to the public, by means of any device or process, whether members of the public capable
of receiving the performance receive it in the same place or in separate place and at the same time or
at different times).
40 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(A)(2011)(Exempting non-subscription broadcast transmission from the
licensing process); See Bonneville, 347 F.3d 485 at 500. (holding that although terrestrial broadcasts
are exempt from licensure, simultaneous internet broadcasts of the same broadcasts are not exempt
from paying royalties).
41 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2011)(Defines “digital transmission” as a transmission in whole or in part in
a digital or other non-analog format).
42 See Wagman, supra note 14, at 100 (explaining that a musical composition requires a public
performance license for both terrestrial and digital broadcast, in addition, it requires a mechanical
license for physical and digital reproduction and distribution. A sound recording requires a public
performance license only for digital broadcast and a master use license for physical and digital
distribution and reproduction); See Tune, supra note 21, at 20-21 (providing an overview of the rights
implicated and the licenses needed).
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B. Licensing Music under the Copyright Act in the Digital Age
Typically, the author of the musical work assigns the copyright to a music
publisher.43 The sound recording performance artist assigns to the record company
the copyright in the sound recording.44
The largest music publisher is The Harry Fox Agency (“HFA”). 45 HFA licenses
the musical works for reproduction and distribution, collects licensing fees and
royalties, and distributes the proceeds to the appropriate parties. 46 To compensate the
composer of the underlying musical work for the right to reproduce or distribute the
work, potential licensees contact HFA, or the publisher holding the copyright.47 For
the purposes of this discussion, the “mechanical licenses” administered by HFA are
limited to the “ephemeral recordings” made on a computer in the process of streaming
a song digitally.48
Additionally, to compensate copyright holders for the right to publicly perform the
work, potential licensees contact a performance rights organization (“PRO”). Three
major PROs manage licensing and fee collection for over 90% of commercially available
music: ASCAP,49 BMI,50 and SESAC.51 Section 115 of the Copyright Act regulates the
issuance of licenses to perform musical works and sound recordings. 52 Each of the
PROs manages the royalty collection for several major labels, and they issue blanket
licenses for their entire catalogs. 53 The licenses are compulsory, meaning that all
correctly made requests for licenses must be granted. 54 The licensee is then able to
perform the work publicly without infringing on the copyright of the underlying
musical work. Because terrestrial radio, internet radio, non-interactive and fully

43 The Author assigns rights to reproduction and distribution to a mechanical licensing entity,
and performance rights to a performance rights organization (“PRO”), see Lydia Pallas Loren,
Copyright in the Digital Age: Reflections on Tasini and Beyond: Untangling the Web of Music
Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. 673, 681-682 (2003)(detailing the history of mechanical licensing, and
the role that mechanical licensing plays in modern music copyright).
44 Kimberly L. Craft, The Webcasting Music Revolution is Ready to Begin, as Soon as we Figure
Out the Copyright Law: The Story of the Music Industry at War with Itself, 24 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 1, 5–6 (2001)(describing how copyrights arise and how the copyrights in sound recordings
end up belonging to the record company).
45 THE HARRY FOX AGENCY, INC., https://www.harryfox.com/public/LicenseMusiclic.jsp (last
visited Apr. 19, 2014).
46 Id. (“HFA was established as an agency to license, collect and distribute royalties on behalf of
musical copyright owners”).
47 THE HARRY FOX AGENCY, INC., https://www.harryfox.com/public/LicenseMusiclic.jsp (last
visited Apr. 12, 2014).
48 17 U.S.C. § 112 (2011) Limitations on Exclusive Rights: Ephemeral Copies.
49 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF SONGWRITERS, COMPOSERS AND PUBLISHERS, http://www.ascap.com/
(last visited Apr. 11, 2014).
50 BROADCAST MUSIC, INC., http://www.bmi.com (last visited Apr. 11, 2014).
51 SOCIETY OF EUROPEAN STAGE AUTHORS AND COMPOSERS, http://www.sesac.com (last visited
Apr. 11, 2014).
52 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2011).
53 In Re Pandora, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36914 at *10-11 (discussing how ASCAP operates in
accordance with a Department of Justice Consent Decree in order to avoid antitrust issues).
54 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2011)(a) Compulsory licenses are subject to (b) the filing of a notice of intent
to obtain a compulsory license, and the (c) royalty payable under the compulsory license. Id.
§115(a)-(c).
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interactive webcasting implicate the public performance right, all forms of broadcast
pay royalties to the PRO for the license to play the music. 55
Section 114 of the Copyright Act governs licensing sound recordings for
performance.56 Terrestrial radio stations have long been exempted from paying the
sound recording copyright holder under this section of the statute. 57 As a result of the
exclusive public performance right by digital audio transmission granted to sound
recording copyright holders, all internet broadcasts require a digital performance
license and pay royalties to the copyright holders of the sound recording as well as the
copyright holder to the underlying musical work. 58
To be eligible for the Section 114 statutory license, the Copyright Act requires that
the service be “non-interactive”; interactive services are not able to obtain the
compulsory license.59 Thus, Spotify and other services classified as interactive under
the statutory definition must negotiate directly with the sound recording copyright
holders in order to license public performances of the copyrighted work via digital
transmission.60 Finally, SoundExchange, a separate, distinct PRO manages the digital
performance rights for sound recording copyright holders. 61
C. Copyright’s Royalty Framework
Webcasters and broadcasters pay for the licenses to use music in the manners
described above. The Copyright Act created the Copyright Royalty Board (“CRB”) to
set the royalty rates for these licenses. 62 The CRB is comprised of three Copyright
Royalty Judges, appointed by the Librarian of Congress. 63 Copyright royalty rates are
set once every five years for the next five-year period.64 In addition, the CRB arbitrates
rate disputes between parties. 65 Licensees pay rates set by the CRB using either the
“801(b)” standard or the free market using the “willing buyer/willing seller” standard. 66
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 114 (2011).
57 Id. § 114(d)(1)(A); the reasoning and justification for this exemption will be discussed infra
Section III.
58 Id.
59 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(7)(2011). Definition of “interactive,” supra note 8; see also Tune, supra
note 21, at 21 (explaining that a compulsory license [under § 114] cannot be obtained for interactive
services, such as on-demand performances, downloads, and podcasts).
60 In re Pandora, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36914 at *38-39 (explaining that the distinction between
interactive and non-interactive services is meaningful because “non-interactive services are eligible
for a compulsory or statutory licensing fee…whereas interactive services must independently
negotiate rates for sound recording licenses”).
61 See generally, SOUNDEXCHANGE, www.soundexchange.com/about (last visited Apr. 12,
2014)(displaying a diagram showing how SoundExchange manages digital performance rights).
62 17 U.S.C. § 801 (2011).
63 Id. § 801(a).
64 Id. § 114(f)(1)(setting procedure for setting five year rate schedules for services based on
statutory classification).
65 Id. § 114(f).
66 17 U.S.C. § 801(b); § 114(f)(2)(B); see also Intercollegiate Broadcast System, Inc. v. Copyright
Royalty Bd., 574 F.3d 748, 756-757 (D.C. Cir. 2009)(discussing the justifications for applying the
“willing buyer/willing seller” standard in the context of digital transmissions of college sporting
events).
55
56
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Given the complexities of the statutory licensing scheme, there have been many
legislative proposals to amend the Copyright Act. 67 Most recently, Pandora joined with
other webcasters who felt they paid unreasonably high royalties, and lobbied for
passage of the Internet Radio Fairness Act. 68 This met with much resistance, however,
and the bill ultimately failed in Congress. 69 Aside from the public and the creators,
the structure of the Copyright Act itself and the music industry add layers of interests
needing protection.70 Without reform, innovation will be curbed, the public interest
will suffer, and the Copyright Act’s original intention and constitutional mandate will
be frustrated.71
III. ANALYSIS
Copyright protection for creative works aims to stimulate artistic creativity for
the general public good.72 Copyright policy demands that recent technological
advances in music streaming technology be construed in light of promoting this
essential purpose.73 The tension between the recorded music industry and these new
media models stems from the tension between copyright protection and copyright
policy.74 The record industry would have the public believe that online music
distribution cannibalizes record sales, driving demand for music down, and will
ultimately lead to the demise of the music industry itself. 75 However, new media and

67 Copyright Legislation, Legislative Developments, 113th Congress, UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2014)(listing currently pending
legislation); compare, e.g., The Internet Radio Fairness Act of 2012, H.R. 6480, 112th Cong. (2012),
with The Songwriter Equity Act of 2014, S. 2321, 113th Cong. (2014).
68 See supra note 67.
69 Glenn Peoples, Pandora Stops Internet Radio Fairness Act Legislation Efforts, To Focus on
CRB,
BILLBOARD
BIZ
(Nov.
25,
2013,
4:59
P.M.
EST),
http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/digital-and-mobile/5800772/pandora-stops-internet-radiofairness-act-legislation (detailing the failure of the IFRA and Pandora’s shift to the CRB, which
ultimately gives rise to the In Re Pandora rate decision analyzed in this comment).
70 See Litman, supra note 4, at 5 (noting that “the number of interests affected by copyright is
huge, and the complaints those interests have with the current regime are diverse”).
71 See id. at 8 (explaining that to the extent that the system poses difficult entry barriers to
creators, imposes demanding impediments on intermediaries, or inflicts burdensome conditions and
hurdles on listeners, the system fails at least some of its purposes).
72 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 431-432 (1983) (stating that incentivizing creative work should be
encouraged, but only in service of the ultimate good of broad availability of literature, music and the
arts); see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
73 See id. at 432 (“When technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the
Copyright Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose”).
74 See New Business Models, supra note 18, at 65 (observing that the music industry is in the
middle of a revolution, and that the “major labels are on life-support”); see also, Litman, supra note
70, at 3. (“Copyright law’s confrontation with evolving technology has been a near-constant theme
since Congress enacted its first copyright law”).
75
Who Music Theft Hurts, RECORDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA,
http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php (last visited Jun. 22, 2014)(asserting that music theft results
in an annual loss of $12.5 billion dollars, 70,000 jobs, and $2 billion in lost wages to American
workers).
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online music distribution present threaten only the record company’s existing business
model.76
Lobbying by particularly powerful parties to the music copyright table has led to
an unbalanced regulatory framework strongly favoring these interests. 77 Such efforts
fracture the Copyright Act’s ability to regulate by carving out exceptions and
exemptions, and push artists and independent record labels to eschew the traditional
copyright process in various ways. Furthermore, the results of such efforts do not
effectively regulate in the current technological environment, as illustrated in the In
Re Pandora rate litigation.
A. Copyright’s Fractured Licensing and Royalty Structure
The Copyright Act currently makes several distinctions when setting the rates
that a given music provider must pay.78
1. Terrestrial Radio’s Exemption
The right to public performance by means of digital audio transmission is an
exclusive right of the owner of a sound recording copyright. 79 Notably, the Copyright
Act does not grant the right to analog performance of a sound recording. 80 The
Copyright Act limits the grant of the exclusive right by exempting “non-subscription
broadcast transmissions.”81 A typical over-the-air radio broadcast must pay the
musician or composer to perform the underlying musical work, but there is no royalty
fee due to the sound recording copyright owner.82 Until the recent introduction of
digital broadcasts, the recorded music industry and radio station owners mutually
benefitted this exemption from paying royalties. 83 Radio stations enjoyed the
exemption from expensive royalties and record companies viewed the radio airplay as
free advertising promoting record sales.84

76 See New Business Models, supra note 18 at 67 (stating that the record labels, their lobbyists
and lawyers are trying to crush an environmental threat posed by the “technology-driven revolution”).
77 See Litman, supra note 4, at 4 (stating that lawyers for copyright intensive interests have come
up with revisions that would “scratch their respective itches”).
78 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2011)(distinguishing between types of digital transmissions, whether
they invoke the digital performance right or are exempted therefrom).
79 17 U.S.C. § 106(6)(2011).
80 Id. § 114(a).
81 Id. § 114(d)(1)(A)(A radio broadcast that does not charge its users a fee is a “non-subscription
broadcast transmission”).
82 Bonneville Int’l Corp., 347 F.3d at 487 (the exemption for non-subscription broadcast
transmissions only pertains to AM/FM broadcast signals).
83 Id. (noting that the exemption from royalties for terrestrial radio broadcasts “produced high
levels of contentment for all parties”).
84 Id. at 488 (noting that Congress enacted and continually reinforced the exemption on the
grounds that radio and television broadcasters promote rather than pose a threat to the distribution
of sound recording)(internal citations omitted).
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The National Association of Broadcasters (“NAB”) has successfully fought to
maintain this exemption through the internet revolution. 85 However, that right is
being parsed by the changes in the technological and statutory environment.
Terrestrial radio stations that simulcast their broadcasts over the internet do not
receive to the statutory exemption.86
To the extent that a music service is a replacement for sales, it cannibalizes the
sales; to the extent that it encourages sales, it promotes sales. 87 Given the steady
decline in recorded, physical-format music sales over the past fifteen years, it is clear
that the record sales are no longer there to justify the exemption from royalties
currently enjoyed by terrestrial radio broadcasts. 88
Congress has repeatedly
attempted to remove the non-subscription broadcast transmission exemption from
paying royalties to sound recording copyright owners, most recently in 2009. 89
However, each of these bills has failed to pass, due to heavy pressure from lobbying
groups like the NAB.90
2. Interactive Webcasters’ Exception
Under the Copyright Act, interactive webcasters are ineligible for statutory
licensing.91 This fact is justified by the threat that interactive webcasters pose to
recorded music sales.92 Because interactive webcasters lie outside the statutory
licensing scheme, they must negotiate directly with the copyright owners. 93 The
archetypal interactive webcaster is Spotify. Spotify’s users can decide what musical
work will play next, choosing from Spotify’s library of over 20 million songs. 94
The first consideration given to interactive webcasters is that they operate within
copyright’s structure. Spotify pays copyright royalties and negotiates directly with
record companies to license the use of their works, much to their detriment. 95 In the
85 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 1056 Before the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995).
86 Bonneville, 347 F.3d 485 at 498 (finding that the DPRA maintained the exemption for
over-the-air broadcast transmissions, but did not extend to “AM/FM webcasting,” i.e. digital
transmission of the same broadcast) (emphasis added).
87 In Re Pandora, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36914 at *40.
88 See Nielson Soundscan, supra note 18.
89 Performance Rights Act, H.R. 848, 111th Cong. (2009).
90 Olga Karif, Terrestrial Radio Royalties Bill Gets Through Mark-Up, BUSINESSWEEK (May 13,
2009),
http://www.businessweek.com/the_thread/techbeat/archives/2009/05/terrestrial_rad.html
(noting that members of Congress were “bombarded” with phone calls representing the music industry
and broadcasters’ distaste for the bill).
91 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2011).
92 In Re Pandora, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36914 at *33 (noting that ASCAP charges a higher
licensing fee to interactive services, as considers its music to be more valuable to those services).
93 See also, Arista Records, 578 F.3d 148 at 150 (noting that if a service is interactive, then that
service is required to pay individual licensing fees to the copyright holders rather than to a PRO
through the compulsory licensing of the Copyright Act).
94 Information, SPOTIFY, http://press.spotify.com/us/information/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2014);
throughout the discussion, Spotify will be used as an example of an interactive webcaster.
95 See Sisario, supra note 20 (reporting that Spotify’s CEO stated that Spotify pays over 70 percent
of its income “back to the industry” in licensing fees, although the actual price of the negotiated
licenses are kept private).
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wake of Napster, this fact should be a welcome change to record companies, seeing
royalties where there were none with the advent of file-sharing.96 On one hand, Spotify
and others similarly situated may be cannibalizing non-existent record sales, but on
the other hand, these services are also cannibalizing peer-to-peer sharing numbers.97
Introducing a statutory framework whereby interactive webcasters can predict their
expenses will promote innovation within this sphere of technological development, the
result of which will be further dissemination of musical works.
B. Failure of the “willing buyer/willing seller” Standard
The “willing buyer/willing seller” standard98 is the process by which the CRB sets
the rates by approximating what the rates would be on the open market. 99 After
abandoning its legislative agenda, Pandora took issue with the CRB rate
determinations in court.100 As discussed in the recent In Re Pandora rate decision,
record companies are holding musical works hostage, demanding a ransom for their
release.101
The Copyright Act classifies Pandora as a non-interactive service, thus entitling
Pandora to compulsory licenses from the PROs. 102 At issue in the In Re Pandora case
are the rates that a non-interactive service must pay. In 2011, ASCAP modified its
rules to allow record companies to selectively withhold from ASCAP the right to license
works to new media entities. 103 Three of the four major record companies withdrew
these rights from ASCAP within a year. 104 In the wake of this withdrawal, the record
companies were free to negotiate direct licenses with new media providers. 105
Although the modification was eventually invalidated, the situation created the

96 Ben Sisario, As Music Streaming Grows, Royalties Slow to a Trickle, NEW YORK TIMES (Jan.
28,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/business/media/streaming-shakes-up-musicindustrys-model-for-royalties.html (stating that purveyors of legally licensed music, such as Pandora,
Spotify and YouTube have been largely welcomed by an industry still buffeted by piracy).
97 Ernesto, Spotify: An Alternative to Music Piracy, TORRENTFREAK (Jan. 2, 2009),
http://torrentfreak.com/spotify-an-alternative-to-music-piracy-090102/ (noting that Spotify is an
application that competes with BitTorrent, a peer-to-peer sharing service).
98 In Re Pandora, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36914 at *101 (defining “fair market value” as the cash
equivalent value at which a willing and unrelated buyer would agree to buy and willing and unrelated
seller would agree to sell)(internal citations omitted).
99 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)(2011)(describing the CRB’s functions and guidelines in setting royalty
rates).
100 Clyde Smith, Pandora Abandons Internet Radio Fairness Act, Turns to Copyright Royalty
Board, HYPEBOT.COM (Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.hypebot.com/hypebot/2013/11/pandora-abandonsinternet-radio-fairness-act-turns-to-copyright-royalty-board.html.
101 In Re Pandora, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *67–81 (detailing the negotiations between Pandora
and Sony Records over licensing rates, and acknowledging “Pandora must pay what Sony wants, or
they can’t use [Sony’s catalog], by law.”) Id. at 81.
102 Arista Records, 578 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2009)(distinguishing between the compulsory
licensing for non-interactive services and the individual licenses needed for interactive services).
103 In Re Pandora, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36914 at *35 (addressing the issue of the “April 2011
ASCAP Compendium Modification”).
104 Id. at *36 (noting that EMI, Sony, and Universal withdrew their new media licensing rights
from ASCAP).
105 Id.
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semblance of an open-market where record companies and webcasters could freely
negotiate licensing terms.106
In the negotiations that followed, Pandora was at a great disadvantage. 107 Sony
capitalized on this lack of bargaining power, drastically increasing the rates that
Pandora paid for access to Sony’s content. 108 Negotiations with Universal brought
similarly dismal results for Pandora. 109 As noted above, the Court held that the 2011
Compendium Modification violated the Consent Decree with the Justice Department
under which ASCAP operates. 110 The Southern District of New York thus held that
ASCAP is required to issue a blanket license for any work in its repertoire, unless the
publishers completely withhold the work from ASCAP. 111
This experiment using the “willing buyer/willing seller” standard to set royalty
rates illustrates the unequal bargaining powers of copyright holders and the
licensees.112 Pandora is the largest webcaster, presumably with the most leverage
against the copyright holders.113 If the largest webcaster cannot survive on the open
market because of abuse of bargaining power by copyright holders, then there is little
hope for smaller webcasters or start-up technologies that employ models that lie
outside the scope of statutory licensing.
C. Counterarguments
In increasing numbers, various parties to the musical copyright transaction are
spurning the copyright regime and rejecting as inadequate the royalties flowing from
streaming services.114 Many artists are forging out on their own instead of submitting
their music to the vagaries of copyright licensing, advocating for the destruction of
copyright.115 “Creative Commons” licenses work alongside copyright and grant
copyright holders some control and enforceable rights over their works. 116 Every day
Id.
Id. at *69 (noting that because Sony bought out EMI’s catalog and effectively controlled 2530% of the market, Pandora could not survive without access to [Sony’s] catalog).
108 In Re Pandora, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36914 at *78 (stating that Sony understood this [5%
rate] to be a 25% increase over the prevailing rate [of 4%]).
109 Id. at *81–91 (detailing the negotiations between Pandora and Universal, wherein Universal
used the Sony rate as a bargaining chip to double the rate from 4% to 8%. As a result of these
negotiations, Pandora instituted this action challenging the legality of the Compendium Modification).
110 Id. at *36 (referring to another Pandora rate district court decision, In Re Pandora Media, Inc.,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133133 *1. (S.D.N.Y. 2013), which requires ASCAP to license to any applicant
all works in its repertoire, and holds that the selective withdrawal violates the provisions of the
Consent Decree as amended).
111 Id. at 92 (granting Pandora partial summary judgment).
112 Id. at 101 (concluding that “there is no competitive market in music rights” and that “fair
market value is a hypothetical matter”)(internal citations omitted).
113 Pandora Remains Top Webcaster, Even After Launch of iTunes Radio, ALLACCESS.COM (Nov.
5. 2013).
114 David Byrne, The Internet is Sucking All Creative Content Out of the World, THE GUARDIAN
(Oct. 11, 2013 10:53 AM).
115 The Surprising History of Copyright and the Promise of a Post-Copyright World,
QUESTIONCOPYRIGHT.ORG, http://questioncopyright.org/promise (last visited Jul. 12, 2014).
116 Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1347, 1381–1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that copyright holders
have the right to allow modification and distribution through an open-source license, of which Creative
106
107
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a new business model or music delivery model arises which attempts to exploit
copyright in new ways.
1. Direct-to-Consumer Marketing
Musicians are utilizing the interconnectedness of the internet age to market
directly to their fans.117 Artists are retaining the copyrights to their own sound
recordings, then marketing directly to their listeners, cutting out the record companies
and copyright licensing structure.118 One of radio’s main functions is to introduce fans
to music they like.119 In bypassing the copyright licensing scheme, artists are
increasing transaction costs as well as consumers’ search costs. 120
2. Creative Commons Licensing
Harvard Law Professor Lawrence Lessig is leading the “Creative Commons”
(“CC”) movement.121 CC licenses essentially allow an artist to limit copyright
protection, allowing certain uses of copyrighted material that would otherwise be
infringing.122 As of 2006, several artists have released artistic material under a CC
license, most notably Nine Inch Nails in 2008.123 Creative Commons performs a useful
function in today’s society: by respecting artists’ rights, but allowing flexibility in
protecting those rights, innovation and new creation is encouraged. 124

Commons is one, and use that is unauthorized by the terms of the licenses still constitutes
infringement).
117 Daphne Carr, Nine Inch Nails Radiohead, Free Music and Creative Competition, L.A. WEEKLY
(May 28, 2008) (stating that Trent Reznor’s release of Nine Inch Nails’ material on-line was a reaction
to and commentary on the “continued failures of the music industry” and the “dismal efforts” made by
his record company).
118 Ernesto, RIAA ‘Protects’ Radiohead’s In Rainbows, TORRENTFREAK (Aug. 1, 2010)
https://torrentfreak.com/riaa-protects-radioheads-in-rainbows-100801/ (detailing Radiohead’s initial
circumvention of the major label by releasing the album for “whatever price you feel comfortable
paying,” and subsequent distribution through Sony and BMI).
119 See New Business Models, supra note 18, at 65 (asserting that record companies and radio are
intermediaries performing match-making functions, connecting consumers with music they like).
120 See id. at 65 (finding that the less centralized the music industry becomes, the greater the
burden on the individual consumer to find new music).
121 CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/about (last visited Apr. 26, 2014);
LESSIG.COM, Biography, http://www.lessig.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2014).
122 See id. (denying that CC is an “alternative to copyright”); See also, CREATIVE COMMONS, How
Do Licenses Operate, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/FAQ#How_do_CC_licenses_operate.3F (last
visited Apr. 26, 2014) (describing the function and legal consequences of issuing a Creative Commons
license).
123 NINE INCH NAILS, The Slip http://dl.nin.com/theslip/signup (last visited Apr. 27, 2014) (“The
Slip is licensed under a Creative Commons attribution non-commercial share alike license,”
encouraging users to download the album and remix the music files without fear of infringement);
CREATIVE COMMONS, Summary of attribution, non-commercial, share like 4.0 license,
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ (last visited Jul. 26, 2014)
124 Lydia Pallas Loren, Building a Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works: Enforcement of
Creative Commons Licenses and Limited Abandonment of Copyright, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 271, 275
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Creative commons licenses arguably provide a unique avenue for musicians to
selectively control and protect their work, but the protection artists reserve is still
enforced through copyright.125 To abandon copyright protection altogether is not
within the mission statement of the CC movement. 126 Copyright and Creative
Commons can exist harmoniously in a digital world. However, the RIAA and ASCAP
among others, see this as a threat to their bottom line. 127 As a result, CC licensing is
unlikely to replace or meaningfully supplement copyright licensing.
3. New Technological Business Models
Finally, technology companies are exploring variations of the internet webcasting
paradigm. SoundCloud is an online purveyor of music that eschews the traditional
copyright process.128 The site allows any user to post a musical work on their server,
provided they agree to the terms and conditions, which grant SoundCloud a “limited,
world-wide, royalty-free and fully paid license.”129 SoundCloud’s business model is
similar to that of YouTube, which is based on user-generated content to stream music
and video.130 Although services such as these operate legally through disclaimers,
there is no guarantee that copyrights will be protected in the first instance. 131 Further,
the DMCA provides safe-harbor provisions for ISP’s and technologies that are based
on user-generated content.132
New business models such as SoundCloud provide a narrow opportunity for
copyright holders to post their music to the public over the internet while granting

(2007)(“Clearly defining the rights on both the public side and the private side is important for this
‘semi-commons’ to effectively achieve the goals of copyright law”).
125 Jacobsen, 535 F.3d 1373 at 1380 (affirming that where a copyright owner grants a license
limited in scope and the licensee acts outside the scope, the licensor can bring an action for copyright
infringement).
126 See generally, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/about (last visited May 30,
2014)(“Creative Commons develops, supports, and stewards legal and technical infrastructure that
maximizes digital creativity, innovation and sharing”).
127 Mike Masnick, ASCAP Claiming That Creative Commons Must Be Stopped; Apparently They
Don’t
Believe
In
Artist
Freedom,
TECHDIRT
(Jun.
25,
2010,
7:57
A.M.)
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100624/1640199954.shtml (showing that ASCAP is fighting
Creative Commons, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and Public Knowledge organizations under the
guise protecting artists’ copyrights).
128 Adam Satariano, SoundCloud Said to Near Deals With Record Labels, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jul.
10, 2014, 5:54 P.M. CT)(detailing SoundCloud’s negotiations with record companies, who are
leveraging copyright violations in order to gain a stake in the company).
129 SOUNDCLOUD, Terms of Use, https://soundcloud.com/terms-of-use (last visited Jul. 11,
2014)(stating that by uploading the material, the user is allowing any other “users, websites and/or
platforms to use, copy, repost, transmit or otherwise distribute, publicly display, publicly perform,
adapt, prepare derivative works of, compile, make available and otherwise communicate to the public”
the material).
130 See generally, YOUTUBE, Copyright Basics, https://www.youtube.com/yt/copyright/ (last visited
May 1, 2014).
131 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2011)(creating a safe-harbor for internet service providers from copyright
infringement liability provided certain criteria are met, including duties that arise when the ISP is
put on notice that user-generated content is copyright protected).
132 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2011).
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SoundCloud a limited license to perform the work, royalty-free.133 SoundCloud is
attractive to investors, who note that royalties typically account for 50-70% of the
webcasters’ budget.134 Although SoundCloud does promote dissemination of creative
works, it does so at the cost of any monopoly the artist may have enjoyed, and cannot
replace copyright protection.
D. Record Company Profits and Interests
Monetary incentives provide motivation for artists to create or record companies
to finance and distribute music.135 Record companies are businesses seeking to
maximize profit, and thus are seen as the enemy of creativity, the musician and the
public alike.136 Since 1999, the patterns of music consumption have been changing,
and the record industry has been slow to adapt. 137 Record companies face extinction
as the marginal cost of producing music approaches zero.138 Artist compensation has
also sharply declined, but a musician has other ways of earning income.139 As a result
of the changing landscape, the recorded music industry should be looking for ways to
adapt to the climate. One of the avenues to revenue generation that should be of major
interest is the burgeoning internet music industry. 140
When the public stops purchasing recorded music, record companies will collapse
under their own weight.141 Yet record companies finance musicians who might
otherwise only partially devote themselves to making music, and thus provide a
valuable service in the dissemination of creative works. 142 Record companies’ survival
depends on embracing new revenue sources such as webcasters.
133 See generally, SOUNDCLOUD, Terms of Use, https://soundcloud.com/terms-of-use (last visited
Jul. 12, 2014).
134 Glenn Peoples, SoundCloud Raises New Funding, BILLBOARD BIZ (Jan. 24, 2014, 6:54 P.M.)
http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/5885281/soundcloud-raises-new-funding
135 But see, New Business Models, supra note 18, at 66 (arguing that most musicians want to
make a living making music, but will continue to do so “for pennies or for free” for the “hedonic values”
of simply making music).
136 See New Business Models, supra note 18, at 88 (stating that record companies are “marketing
and promotion bureaucracies” that depend on the high margins album sales generate in order to
survive).
137 See supra, note 17 and accompanying text; see also, New Business Models, supra note 18, at
80 (noting that “fundamental change is difficult” for record companies whose interests are entrenched
in the physical-medium model of delivery of music).
138 New Business Models, supra, note 18, at 80 (arguing that record labels’ business models have
substantial overhead and are bound by inertia that have not been adjusted to fit current technology);
Gerald R. Faulhaber, File Sharing, Copyright, and the Optimal Production of Music, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 77, 91 (2006)(noting that although the marginal cost of making may be
rapidly decreasing, there is a social cost when record companies produce less music).
139 Mark F. Schultz, Live Performance, Copyright, and the Future of the Music Business, 43 U.
RICH. L. REV. 685, 685 (2009) (asserting that live performance is the only “unique, excludable,
non-duplicable product left in the music business”).
140 See Sisario supra note 20 (noting Pandora paid $147 million in royalties in 2011).
141 See Litman, supra note 4, at 12 (noting that there are many ways to distribute music without
spending much money, and that the new economics of the digital world dictate that intermediaries’
(i.e. record companies, distributors) rights should be severely limited).
142 See New Business Models, supra note 18, at 79 (detailing record companies’ typical functions:
1) recruiting artists, 2) providing capital, 3) managing the recording process, 4) manufacturing CDs,
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IV. PROPOSAL
The Copyright Act is the most advantageous way to deal with copyright licensing
and royalties, therefore all forms of online music delivery should be brought within
this framework.143
Eliminating exemptions and exceptions and establishing
predictable rates across technological platforms will encourage innovation, which in
turn will better serve copyright’s purpose of making creative works widely available to
the public.144
As discussed above, copyright royalties are a labyrinth for new technologies to
maneuver, and unless there is a concerted effort to normalize the rate structure,
technological advances will be inhibited.145 Music delivery models are moving within
copyright’s boundaries, a trend that is encouraging to copyright holders. 146 The
paradigm has shifted, but the public still has a great interest in hearing music.147
Instead of seeking to protect profits that resulted from record sales, record companies
should be seeking to maximize profit from the models which the public endorses.
There is no single, simple solution to this issue. The decisions that reshape
copyright law should be made in light of copyright policy, even in the face of the
recorded music industry’s tough lobbying efforts. 148 Due to the lack of serious
alternatives to copyright licensing, the regulatory framework must be updated to
match the revolution in the listenership and reflect the ever-changing landscape.
These competing demands call for three changes that should be made to the copyright
act.
A. Eliminate Terrestrial Radio’s Exemption from Copyright Royalties
The first change to be made is the elimination of terrestrial radio’s exemption from
paying royalties. The economic justifications which have maintained the exemption

5) advertising and promoting CDs, 6) distributing media, 7) revenue and royalty accounting functions,
and 8) copyright enforcement).
143 Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Principles Program, Directions for Reform, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1176 (noting that a well-functioning copyright system effectively creates
and regulates markets around the works that it protects, and in the process, copyright plays a role
in the new technologies that allow access to creative works).
144 See Craft, supra note 44, at 3 (observing that as of the last major revision of the Copyright Act,
the DMCA, there were so many conflicts that innovation and new technologies stagnated while the
conflicts were sorted out).
145 See DIGITAL MEDIA ASSOCIATION, Issues and Policy: Modernizing Music Licensing to Promote
Innovative Business Models, http://www.digmedia.org/issues-and-policy/copyright-and-royalties/145modernizing-music-licensing-to-promote-innovative-business-models (last visited May 31, 2014).
146 But see Webcasters and Rising Royalty Fees: Paying the Price for Innovation? THE
WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 18, 2007) (quoting John Simson, executive director of SoundExchange: “The
attitude that really has to change is the idea that the people playing this music on the Web are
somehow doing artists a favor”).
147 See Ericsson, supra note 5, at 1803 (stating that interactive streaming services has further
expanded the market for legal consumption of digital music).
148 See Litman, supra, note 4 at 6 (noting that interests involved in the current copyright regime
are varied and often adverse, and that those interests get nervous when new parties attempt to declare
their rights).
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since radio’s inception cannot survive close scrutiny. 149 The sheer will and power of
the NAB holds the exemption in place. 150 Broadcast radio is a $20 billion industry,
who, without justification should be forced to pay royalties the same way that other
services who are publicly performing sound recordings do. To do this, § 114(d)(1) would
have to be stricken from the Copyright Act, and the word “digital” stricken from
§ 106(6).
B. Integrate Interactive Webcasters Into the Copyright Structure
The second recommendation is to allow interactive webcasters to participate in
the statutory licensing scheme. Interactive webcasters do not replace record sales to
the extent that record companies would have us believe. Furthermore, because owning
music is not as desirable as it once was, interactive webcasting promotes music as
much as traditional radio broadcasts do.151 The copyright act does recognize the
importance of regulating webcasters by including non-interactive webcasters in the
statutory licensing scheme, but this does not go far enough.152
C. Allow Room for Technological Growth
The third modification that is in line with the changed landscape of the music
industry in the Web 2.0 age is that the Copyright Act should address technologies not
yet on the market. Rather than leave it up to the courts, or the individual interests
involved, the copyright act should set up an effective way to deal with new media
business models that would encourage growth and innovation. 153 With royalty rates
that are predictable, emerging technologies in online music delivery can take into
149 Kurt Hanson & Jay Rosenthal, Sounds and Cents, L.A. TIMES (June 12, 2007)(arguing that
terrestrial radio’s exemption from paying royalties is an “injustice” and that eliminating the
exemption will level the playing field for webcasters). In addition, Hanson and Rosenthal note that
the exemption from terrestrial radio in the U.S. has negative international repercussions for American
musicians and record labels. Id.
150 See Craft, supra note 44, at 6 (noting that the RIAA released a statement attributing the
tenacity of the broadcast radio exemption to the strong lobby presence of the industry in Washington);
FREE RADIO ALLIANCE, Press Release: The White House on Performance Rights (Mar. 21, 2011)
http://freeradioalliance.org/2011/03/the-white-house-on-performance-rights/ (noting that although
the right of public performance sees broad support both from the White House and the Copyright
Office, both Free Radio Alliance and the NAB argue that such a right will be detrimental to local radio
stations); see also, Hanson and Rosenthal, supra note 149.
151 News and Notes on RIAA Industry Shipment and Revenue Statistics, RECORDING INDUSTRY
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, http://76.74.24.142/4A176523-8B2C-DA09-EA23-B811189D3A21.pdf (last
visited May 31, 2014)(noting that digital growth (of RIAA sales in 2012) was driven by a shift in user’s
“access models,” from single song online purchases to free online listening to vast libraries of music).
152 See Ericsson, supra note 6, at 1811 (noting that it is within the recorded music industry’s
self-interest and a comprehensive copyright policy to pursue an all-inclusive online music delivery
licensing policy).
153 I. Trotter Hardy, Project Looking Forward, Sketching the Future of Copyright in a Networked
World 1, 258 (1998) (available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/thardy.pdf) (noting that the
problem is that without foresight, Congress must legislate under uncertainty, and the issue is whether
the new technology will grow sufficiently important that it will replace existing ones).
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account the expenses that would be involved in their venture, instead of gambling on
what they might be forced to pay after a significant investment. 154 New technologies
that operate within copyright’s framework will be encouraged with the ability to
accurately forecast royalty expenses.
There is no single sentence that can be added or stricken from the Copyright Act
to account for technologies known or unknown that have yet to impact the music
industry.155 What interested parties can be certain of is that technology has
revolutionized the music industry again and again, and will do so in the future.156 The
revolutionizing technology strains the language of the act, stretches the application of
the regulatory framework and taxes judicial, business, and legislative resources
sorting the mess out.157 The regulatory framework should be flexible enough to handle
changes that lie on the horizon and beyond, or else Copyright risks becoming
irrelevant.158
D. No Effective Alternative to Copyright Exists
There is no alternative to copyright licensing or royalties that effectively regulates
and enforces musical authors’ copyrights. Alternatives to copyright licensing are
taking shape, but each of the systems has flaws.
Direct to consumer marketing ignores the benefits that marketing, publicizing,
distribution, and exposure that record companies provide. In the recorded music
paradigm, record companies provide capital for expenses related to recording and thus
are furthering the goal of the public’s access to creative works. 159 In a world without
intermediaries as investors, financial constraints would choke out creativity. The fact
154 See Ericsson, supra note 6, at 1787 (pointing out that the end result of a lack of legislative
guidance and judicial decisions is a suboptimal utilization of the internet both as an incentive for
creation of music and models for music’s dissemination).
155 For an example of language that encapsulates future developments, see 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2011)
(extending copyright protection to any work fixed in a tangible medium “known or later developed,”
thus encompassing technologies and media not in existence at the time of drafting).
156 Devin Coldewey, 30 Years Ago, the CD Started the Digital Music Revolution, NBC NEWS (Sep.
28, 2012) http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/gadgets/30-years-ago-cd-started-digital-music-revolutionf6167906; Chris Neiger, Is Intel on the Cusp of the Next Tech Revolution?, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Jan. 11,
2014)
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/01/11/is-intel-on-the-cusp-of-the-next-techrevolution.aspx.
157 See Litman, supra note 4, at 4-5 (chronicling the Copyright Act’s revisions as new technology
stretched the previous Act to its limits). Litman also posits that each iteration of the Copyright Act
has been a reflection of the copyright-affected interests’ reshaping of the Act to accommodate their
needs and fears. Id. at 6; Richard A. Posner & Williams M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 331 (1989) (arguing that rights in intangibles, like intellectual property
rights, are especially expensive to enforce).
158 See Samuelson, supra note 143, at 1216 (making suggestions for future guidance and reform,
including the incorporation of safe harbor provisions for those services that make reasonable efforts
to deter infringements).
159 But see, New Business Models, supra note 18, at 98 (arguing that musicians will continue to
make music despite the fact that they are not making any money, because doing so satisfies the
musician’s hedonic, or non-pecuniary, desires); Litman, supra note 4, at 7 (stating that perhaps the
incentives that copyright currently gives to distributors actually controverts copyrights purpose by
placing control of access into the hands of record companies, whose main motive is profit, not
dissemination or creation).

[14:292 2015] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

312

that some musicians have eschewed record companies in releasing their music does
not lead to the conclusion that records companies should not exist at all. Rather, the
inescapable conclusion is that the recorded music industry thus must adapt or
perish.160
Creative Commons licensing grants an artist a level of control over a given
copyright.161 Thus, without a copyright to constrain, there would be no creative
commons license.162 Furthermore, Creative Commons does not contain nor attempt
any regulation or enforcement.163 CC license are simply an alternative to traditional
copyright licensing.164
Finally, although some innovation has occurred at the fringes of online music
delivery, the models in existence today operate to circumvent copyright control. Rather
than to provide a reasonable and equitable alternative to copyright, operations which
purport to grant licenses to users without a primary copyright check is inadequate. 165
Given the scale of copyright, both in musical works and sound recordings, the only
structure of the magnitude necessary is the Copyright Act. However, the framework
presents several adaptive shortcomings which require consideration before the next
revolution occurs.
V. CONCLUSION
All legislative decisions to amend the Copyright Act should be guided by the
purpose set forth by the framers of the Constitution. 166 Copyright royalties should be
regulated through a tested, established framework, and an effective, predictable
incentive protects the intellectual property of musicians and authors currently in
existence. The current Copyright Act is not well-adapted to change, while the world
continues to change at an exponentially increasing speed.167 In order to accommodate
the nature of the landscape, any revisions to the copyright act should take the pace of
change into account. A single band-aid solution will not solve the problems facing
everybody in the music industry. Some parties will be forced to readjust to losses and
160 Alexandra Topping, ‘Record Labels are not Dinosaurs of the Music Industry’, THE GUARDIAN
(May 13, 2011) http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/may/13/record-labels-not-dinosaursmusic-industry (quoting Tony Wadsworth, current chairman of BPI and former CEO of EMI as saying:
“Today’s record labels are unrecognizable compared to those of the 90’s, they are smaller, more
efficient, and they have diversified and taken on many more functions”).
161 See, supra note 121.
162 Pallas Loren, supra note 124, at 274 (Creative Commons licenses “are designed to permit
certain uses of creative works that would otherwise be subject to the full panoply of rights the
Copyright Act grants to copyright owners.”).
163 Id. at 274.
164 Id. at 273 (stating that creative commons seeks to build a flexible licensing structure in the
face of increasingly inflexible and restrictive copyright rules).
165 Ernesto, Universal Music Can Delete Any SoundCloud Track Without Oversight,
TORRENTFREAK.COM (Jul. 3, 2014) (detailing Universal Music Group’s unorthodox enforcement of
copyright on the SoundCloud platform, which takes music directly off the server and allows no
recourse to that user to appeal).
166 See Mazer, supra note 22, 347 U.S. at 219.
167 Litman, supra note 4, at 3 (“the statute is not well-designed to withstand change, and has aged
badly”).
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profit margins that do not measure up to the time when consumers would gladly pay
$14.99 for a compact disc. The sooner record companies come to grips with the
revolution that has already occurred, the sooner they can find the new baseline from
which to build and grow.
The interest of the public in hearing the works of musicians and performing artists
is paramount. The best way to protect that interest is to properly incentivize creation,
which will ensure that musicians keep writing music, record companies keep
supporting artists and distributing music, new technologies are harnessed to deliver
the music. By fostering growth through a streamlined statutory framework in which
new media flourish, the resulting environment will better serve the interests of the
public, the recording industry, webcasters, and the music community. In creating such
a model for sustainable growth in the digital music marketplace, musicians will gain
exposure, the public will gain access, and the recorded music industry will see new
revenue growth.

